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Chapter V
Christian Religious Foundations in Western Europe: Between
Spirituality and Wordliness
Introduction
This paper is about one of the most important, and yet less studied, features of early modern western
societies: religious foundations.1 Why has historiography neglected  Christian  foundations?
Fundamentally, in our view, this has been for two reasons. The first one derives from the legal basis on
which the institution had been built, that is the specific,  and today almost entirely incomprehensible,
concept of  the  autonomy and yet effectiveness of religious law in relation to civil  law. Religious  law,
known, taught, and studied under the name of canon law, created a specific legal space at the core of all
Christian societies: a legal space under ecclesiastical supervision, administered by ecclesiastical courts,
on which the king himself  had  in principle little influence,  and a legal  space  where not only civil
regulations, but also the basic principles on which civil society lay, were suspended and substituted by
religious concepts. Time, inheritance, patrimonial transmission, inequality, and death itself (the Church
was considered as eternal) were excluded. And yet, what ecclesiastical courts determined under canon
law had efficacy in the civil sphere. Many objects shaped by ecclesiastical law were handled by lay
persons and insert- ed, along with purely lay objects, into social strategies, in such a way that many
aspects of the profane world were in fact indirectly commanded by ecclesiastical regulations. Present-
day citizens of Western countries still  have in common with their Ancien Régime ancestors a sharp
distinction drawn between ecclesiastical  and civil law, and between ecclesiastical and civil society. 
1 The lack of studies is blatant. Classic references on ecclesiastical history are practically silent on this topic. See for
instance [Aldea Vaquero et  al.  1973–1987; Delumeau 1965:  417; 1971: 358].  Things are changing,  at least  in
France and Spain, the countries to which the present paper mainly refers.  In  the Hispanic world,  a few ground-
breaking studies paved the way at the end of the last century [Pro Ruiz 1989; Wobeser 1996; Barbazza 2000]. A
small  trickle  of  papers  has  followed  since then,  although the movement  does not  seem to be really gathering
momentum. They nevertheless suggest that  the concept is slowly gaining ground.
2
Nevertheless, they have  lost the sense of symbiosis which in the Ancien Régime
united  both  spheres.  All  subjects  of  all  civil  powers  were  also  members  of  a
Church, whatever its denomination, and as such subject to canon law, while beliefs
were not a private matter,  but  a  fundamental  part  of social  and political  global
organization. Historians no longer understand these kinds of overlapping functions
which  provided  the  basis   on  which  all  social  and  political  institutions  were
established in Europe, at least until the end of the eighteenth century [Dedieu 2010:
especially chap. 1]. To what they do not understand, they make themselves blind,
and such an ignorance pervasively distorts their conclusions. Obviously, all fields
of  historical  knowledge  are  not  affected  to  the  same  degree.  Ecclesiastical
foundations are probably the most impacted. Their essence precisely consists in
“spiritualization,”  in  other  words  the  management  under  ecclesiastical  rules,  of
economic resources,  that is, of typically mundane social objects, precisely those
considered as most foreign to spirituality and to religion. In  that way Christian
foundations stretch  to  their  utmost  the  mix between  the  civil  and  ecclesiastical
spheres, so as to make it invisible, for those who are not aware beforehand, of its
presence. Christian religious foundations have been ignored because they consist in
a legal figure, the terms of which have been almost totally forgotten.
The second reason is their scant visibility in the sources. This is due, in turn,
to three factors. First is the fact that religious foundations are by essence “mort-
mains.” That means that they are not normally subject to transmission. They are
supposed to remain identical from their creation onwards, under the same owner,
with no sales, no mortgages, no post-mortem inventories, and no mention in wills.
They generate far fewer documents than any other kind of estate or commodity. We
know them mostly through indirect sources, when they appear involved in some
kind of operation of the civil sphere, which does not directly concern them, but
makes necessary their mention as secondary,  and mainly passive, actors in it. The
second reason is their plasticity. Christian religious foundations, although based on
a common set of principles, have been used by social actors in such a variety of
ways so as to make a complete inventory of them practically impossible. Should
such an inventory exist, it would nevertheless be unable to describe the social reali-
ty based on the institution. Religious foundations were part of the Church’s life, the
material existence of which they sustained. They were also a fundamental part of
family estates, and had an essential function in their exploitation and transmission.2
They were  in  fact  fundamental  tools for  patrimonial  management.  Families  not
only created specific forms of religious foundation to answer specific needs, they
also invented specific ways of putting them to work in accordance with specific
contexts. Understanding these strategies means understanding also, in some detail,
2    This side of the question has been specially stressed in the works of [Wobeser 1996;
Pro Ruiz 1989], quoted in note 1.
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the strategic configurations of family patrimonial interests at that same moment, a
huge task which social history did not undertake until recently. The third factor is
that sources related to religious foundations are mostly preserved in ecclesiastical
archives, which historians of the early modern world have not until recently tapped
to get materials for civil social history.
The first two parts of our exposition will describe the institutional side of
the question, both from the legal and from the practical point of view. The third
part will stress the role of Christian foundations in the management of patrimonial
strategies.
1. Religious Foundations as Legal Institutions
1. 1. Mortmain: Time vs. Eternity/Civil Law vs. Canon Law
Religious foundations, as they were institutionalized in early modern Europe, can
be defined as the possibility given to Christians to turn into “mortmain” any kind
of assets—real estate or money—and to assign them for religious or charitable pur-
poses.3 Making assets subject to “mortmain” (from the French main morte, literally,
dead hand) means that they no longer were at their owner’s or administrator’s dis-
posal. The purpose they were assigned to by the act of foundation could no longer
be changed. They could not be sold or in any other way alienated or mortgaged.
Administrators and beneficiaries were not properly owners. They just received the
profits  generated  by the assets  and took conservative  measures  to  preserve  the
value and profitability of the foundation, but in no way might they dispose of the
“principal,” the objects on which the mortmain had been set. The asset, in a sense,
had no proprietor, but itself. It  existed in its own right, was endowed with legal
person- ality, and became an autonomous legal object. The owner was normally the
main term of the dyad he formed with the object: property was precisely defined as
the right given to the owner to “use and abuse” the object. In mortmain the object
was the main term: the possessor was only a temporary incumbent with limited
rights  of use. He did not even always choose the object: in many foundations, the
object nominated its owner, after its own rules, for the duration set by those rules.
In such a way, mortmain removed the object from the domain of changes generated
by time, and consequently also removed it from the domain of the usual legal
system
3  All the  data  we use to  deal  with  the  institutional  side  of the  question were  common
knowledge for Ancien Régime lawyers. We drew our information from the reference works
of  the  time.  The  most  famous  was  [Thomassin  1752];  we  use  it  in  its  standard  Latin
translation, although it was first published in 1680, in French.  We also used [Gibert 1750]
and  the very clear, concise, and highly useful [Febrero 1825], which was a standard Spanish
legal textbook at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century.
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created to manage the changes that the passing of time made necessary. The asset
set in mortgage was in some sense made eternal, an aspect which the civil legal
system could not assume. The object had consequently to be assigned to a legal
system based on eternity. God only is eternal. The most obvious ascription was to
canon law, the legal system created to manage God’s interests in this world.
Mortmain was, moreover, a typical case of an artificial legal object created
and shaped to  answer  a  specific  social  demand.  All  legal  objects  are  artificial
creations, but some remain closer than others to what the usual legal practice of
their  time considers  as  natural.  Western  religious  foundations  were  outside  the
bounds of normal legal practice. They established a specific order of succession as
to whom would enjoy them, which necessarily excluded some legal heirs, and they
implied in fact a clear breach of all the usual rules of inheritance. They also meant
a breach of all usual norms of state regulation: they could not be confiscated, for
instance, and the will of the founder was considered superior to any other current
legal disposition ratified by the king. Such an “out of the way” character made it
nec- essary to ground them on transcendental principles, superior to human norms.
In Christian—as well as in Muslim—countries, foundations were rooted in God.
They were defined as a service made to God’s people or to God’s servants, and not
to individuals.
In a Christian context, resorting to God meant resorting to the Church, an
organization specially designed to channel relationships between Humankind and
God, to keep together both spiritual and mundane universes. Religious foundations
were supposed to be a property of the Christian community,  represented by  the
Church. In fact, each foundation was assigned to a specific organization within the
Church,  either  an  existing  one  or  an  entity  created  ad hoc,  just  to  provide  an
institutional  frame  from which  to  make  the  foundation  hang.  But  the  ultimate
owner,  the  supreme  regulator  who  in  the  final  resort  would  decide  about  the
foundation,  was  the  Christian community itself,  represented  by its  head,  in  the
Catholic world, the Pope. This meant that religious foundations were from the start
not only out of reach of civil courts and of political institutions,4 but also that they
were in some way out of the reach of local ecclesiastical institutions, the more so
as  centralization increased  in  the  Catholic  world.  The only competent  law was
canon law, a legal system which substantially depended on the Roman Curia, and
the only competent tribunals were those of the bishops, acting as representatives of
the Pope, whose decisions could be appealed through the Curia. Foundations were
one of the
4  
 In most cases, a special class of “lay” foundations, whose only purpose was usually to
say some masses for the deceased and whose capital was de facto a rent set on estates held
by  lay  owners  (see below),  were  in  fact  largely under civil  jurisdiction.  Ecclesiastical
authorities made sure that the purpose of the foundation was correctly fulfilled,  but they
did no select incumbents nor mediate in its economic management [Febrero 1825:  Vol.  2,
83–84].
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most powerful tools at the Pope’s disposal to establish progressively his supreme
authority in the Church from the twelfth century on, the time when papal lawyers
began to organize canon law into a cohesive system. The fact that he was the head
of the ecclesiastical mortmain apparatus gave him a hand in the local affairs of any
part of the Christian world, and not only in merely spiritual matters.
A foundation was instituted by the founder’s will—will in a psychological
sense, but also usually will as a legal deed enacted shortly before death. What a
foundation made eternal  was,  in fact,  the founder’s  will. And as founders were
usually laymen, religious foundations may be seen not so much as a transfer of
resources to the Church, but as a tool provided by the Church to laymen in order
to make their own will eternal. For obvious reasons, as the foundation seriously
impaired the owner’s liberty, it had to be instituted on assets at the full disposal of
the founder. Foundations could not be established, for instance, on entities already
set  in  mortmain.  When creating a foundation, founders  had to make clear  four
points: they had to describe as fully as they could the assets to be included, and the
purpose  of  the  new  entity  and  to  name  administrators  and  incumbents.
Administrators were in charge of the preservation of the mortmain’s profitability
and of the choice of beneficiaries. The founder’s decision was everlasting and the
mortmain  perpetual.  The  founder  named  the  first  beneficiary  and  the  first
administrator, and he set rules for the choice of future agents, which nobody could
change, except the Pope and, in some cases, a bishop acting as a delegate of the
Pope.
1. 2. The Benefits of Founding
1. 2. 1. For Founders
Who took advantage of the foundation? First of all, obviously, it was the found-
er.  He acquired a spiritual benefit  from the fact that he had performed a  highly
meritorious deed, something the community highly approved of. Readers are free
to interpret this benefit from a theological point of view as a service done for the
founder’s soul and an insurance against hell, or from a social point of view as a
sense  of  greatness  in  the  eyes  of  the  community.  Both  visions  were  probably
present at the same time in the founder’s mind.5 Establishing a foundation thus
provided a double gratification, or even a triple one, for it made the founder’s will
eternal. A will (deed) only obliged the next generation: the testator’s heirs were
free to do what they wanted with the assets transferred by the will. A foundation
had eternal obligations. Centuries after the establishment, the descendants of the
founder would
5 [Herreros Moya 2012] underscores such a duality.
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still be compelled by his will. This was also an important reward.6
1. 2. 2. For Incumbents
The incumbent obviously got his reward: he received the neat revenue produced
by the foundation as a compensation for the task the founder had assigned to him.
This task had to be “spiritual,” that is, to match the functions assumed by the
Church. Maintaining a member, or members, of the clergy was one of the purposes
most obviously approved of by the Church. Positions endowed in that way were
called “benefices.” They were so important for the organization of religious life
that Pope and councils, with the help of the Catholic sovereign, had progressively
recast them into a unique model which almost, but not totally, excluded laymen
from their administration and divided the total amount of resources into as many
benefices as were necessary to fill the many positions of the parish system, which
itself was the basis of the ecclesiastical territorial organization. Other foundations
endowed monasteries and convents, and maintained nuns and monks, though not
friars (Dominicans, Franciscans, and the like) who refused perpetual endowments
and lived on alms. Others maintained a numerous non-parochial secular clergy, as
numerous as parish priests; this clergy almost totally disappeared when the ben-
efice system broke down in the nineteenth century. Some benefices of this kind
were full endowments and were able to maintain a full-time cleric on one benefice
only. Others were small or very small portions, on which making a decent living
was impossible: their incumbents had to hold a number of them, or to get stipends
from them to survive. Still others just paid for some masses every year, and had
no permanent incumbent: whoever said the masses pocketed a salary from them.
Such minute foundations mainly required from the incumbent tasks related with
the founder’s spiritual well-being, such as saying masses for his soul and for that
of the members of his family. They were usually called chaplaincies. No one could
be ordained in the secular clergy, in the eighteenth century, if he was not endowed
with enough such non-parochial benefices to be able to make a living from them.7
Other foundations were dedicated to the maintenance of ecclesiastical buildings.
Those for parochial churches were organized on a basis similar to that of the
benefices for parochial clergy. Other foundations provided for hospitals, 
6  Some  mayorazgos,  a  laicized foundation system which  we  shall  describe further,  even
imposed upon beneficiaries the obligation of using forever the same first and second name
as the founder. Laicization made possible in mayorazgos the expression of a measure of self-
assertion which could not be made explicit in a religious context.
7 Members of the secular clergy could also own personal property which, from the moment
they became members of the clergy to their death, depended on ecclesiastical jurisdiction,
but it did not enjoy the status of mortmain foundation assets.
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chapels,and isolated religious monuments, such as crosses and statues. Others did
not provide for the building proper, but its ornament and decoration: maintaining a
lamp burning in a church, or in front of a saint’s altar, or a saint’s statue, was one
of the most usual practices of this kind. The benefit for the local clergy was then
only an indirect one: the foundation enhanced the prestige of their church, which
meant more visitors, more alms, and more religious services charged by, and paid
to, themselves.
Other  foundations provided for  social  needs and services.  Hospitals were
endowed by foundations, which paid either for the hospital as such, or for its chap-
el, for the provision of hospital workers, or for the stay of the ill or of pilgrims.
The same was true of universities, of many grammar schools, and of some primary
schools, which were maintained along these lines, from the buildings themselves
to an impressive system of grants for students. Other foundations provided relief
in times of epidemics or famine, help for the “ashamed poor,” impoverished mem-
bers of the middle-class who refused to live in a hospital or to beg for alms in the
streets, dowries for meritorious maidens, and the like.
All these activities were considered as Church-related, and as such eligible
for foundation status. It must be noted that in Western Europe such a list was in
fact  restrictive.  Except  some  few  possible  exceptions,  no  other  collective
equipment  (roads,  bridges,  fortifications,  urban  facilities,  markets,  etc.)  was
considered, at the end of the Ancien Régime, as relevant foundation matter. This
was a result  of a state policy firmly continued over time in almost all European
countries  that  tended  to  contain  religious  foundations  within  strict  bounds  to
preserve the civil sphere—which the State controlled—from encroachment.
Incumbents were chosen by the founder or in accordance with a set of rules
established by the founder. Founders usually limited the group of eligible persons
to members of their family, to natives of their village or province, to people of a
specific character, or at least established priorities in favor of them. The Church
added its own rules, especially when the incumbent had to fulfill an ecclesiastical
function. Better said, the Church tried to impose such rules. It  was a hard fight
against  private interests which, for a long time, had the upper hand and backed
the founders’  free  will.  Never  could the Catholic  Church,  in fact,  fully enforce
the obligation for incumbents to fulfill the conditions which canon law demanded
from clerics named to the corresponding ecclesiastical position, and stop the usual
practice of an inept incumbent hiring underpaid deputies to do the job they were
 themselves unable to carry out. It met a measure of success as far as positions for
which the priesthood was required  in terms of  pastoral  tasks,  fundamentally in
parish  vicariates  and  curateships.  Many  other  ecclesiastical  positions  remained
open  to  the  founders’  choice  with  slight  obligations  for  the  incumbent.  Most
notable  among  them  were  the  “simple”  benefices,  chaplaincies  which  did  not
involve pastoral care, just saying private masses for the dead in exchange for a
decent living, and which, 
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till  the end of the Ancien Régime, could be served through deputies chosen by
incumbents  who were  not  themselves  priests,  but  students  or  intellectuals  who
considered the benefice as a grant for their studies or research.
The  Catholic  Church  also  intended  to  gain  full  control  of  the  selection
process, by choosing the person among those who fulfilled the required conditions.
In the sixteenth century the Church enforced the rule that possession of the most
important  benefices  had  to  be  granted  by  the  bishop  to  otherwise  nominated
incumbents, a precept which endowed the ecclesiastical hierarchy with a kind of
veto on inconvenient  designations.  It  also succeeded,  around the same time,  in
curbing the liberty that incumbents had enjoyed until then of transmitting freely
their endowment to whom they thought fit,  a practice known as “resignation in
favor of another,” or as “coadjutor,” or as “swapping,” depending on the legal form
this transmission took. But the Church did not succeed in fully suppressing such
behavior, nor probably really desired to do so. It rather tried to make mandatory
getting a license from the Pope before swapping or resigning, in order to enhance
the unity of the Church and the power of the Church’s central  authorities. This
centralizing  policy  paved  the  way  for  state  intervention.  Once  local  dynamics
previously at  play had been curbed by Rome, the state only had to capture papal
faculties to take possession of the whole package, with little or no opposition from
the  local  establishment  which,  anyway,  had  already  lost  control  and  which
preferred on the whole bargaining with their national leaders rather than with the
distant and notoriously expensive Roman court. This is what happened in England
under Henry VIII, and in Spain under Ferdinand VI (mid-eighteenth century), as
we shall see below.
1. 2. 3. For Administrators
A third actor was the administrator (or administrators) of the foundation. Two sides
of the question must be considered: the administration of the assets which made the
“principal” of the foundation, for one; the right of “patronage,” that is the right to
name the incumbent, when an incumbent had to be named, for the other.
Being perpetual,  the foundation had to produce a yearly income. It  could
not be based on a lump sum of money to be given once and for all from which
yearly portions would be drawn. Foundations necessarily had to be made up of a
capital, technically known as the “principal,” invested in a support which would
produce earnings, while at the same time preserving the capital itself from attrition.
That meant that somebody had to take corresponding investment decisions. Such a
faculty also meant the power of diverting capital to one channel or another; which
in turn meant economic and social influence. It also implied that somebody had to
run the business from which the income was drawn, and that such a person also,
although indirectly, benefited from the foundation. There thus existed between the
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founder and the incumbent, a layer of administrators, trustees, contractors, farmers,
and the like, who in the most material way helped to draw money from the princi-
pal and passed it on to the incumbent. Seen from an economic point of view, the
foundation was an entity which provided capital to entrepreneurs, at the price of a
yearly rent.  Canon law had set  strict  and detailed rules as to the conditions for
establishing foundations and the designation of incumbents. It  said nothing how-
ever of this intermediary layer,  which was left to the free decision of founders.
Particularly,  no rule established any fixed relationship between the value of the
principal and the amount paid to the incumbent, except that this amount could not
be  above  the  profits  produced  by  the  principal.  This  allowed  founders,  if  they
wished to, to impose low charges on huge principals, for the ultimate benefit of the
administrators.  This  also  made  possible  for  administrators  to  divert  part  of  the
income to their own profit, that is to use the foundation as a convenient legal shell
to get from canon law advantages that civil law could not afford.8 Neither did canon
law  say  anything  as  to  the  choice  of  such  administrators,  farmers,  and
entrepreneurs. Nothing prevented the founder from nominating them when creating
the foundation, and choosing them from among members of his family,  if so he
wished.
The choice of the support for the investment was made by the founder. It
had to be stable enough to ensure perpetuity.  Real estate was, of course,  highly
favored, especially agricultural land which did not demand as continuous a supply
of fresh resources from the owner to preserve its value from depreciation as town
houses did. It  could also be, and often was, an amount of money to be invested
in securities, or in commercial and industrial ventures. But whatever the support,
somebody had to make it produce. This task rarely could be the incumbent’s. The
purpose for  which  he had been  endowed was  not  to  run  a shop,  till  farmland,
or indulge in trade. Real estate had to be put out to rent. Secure and productive
investments had to be found for money. Leases and grants could be negotiated and
overlooked by the incumbent himself, by the patron (see below), or by a third party
acting as an administrator.  The founder could also decide that  the estate  which
supported  the  foundation  would  remain  an  inalienable  part  of  the  family’s
patrimony,  and be managed as  such by the heir,  usually the eldest  son, simply
paying  an  annual  rent  to  the  incumbent.  In  such  a  situation,  the  ecclesiastical
character  of  the foundation almost faded away and practical  results were  fairly
similar to those of   a lay entail, an institution which we shall briefly comment
upon below. A global overview of around a hundred cases we had the opportunity
to study in some detail
8  “What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is nothing
new under the sun,” [Eccles 1:9]. Patrimonial engineering was not invented in the twentieth
century. In fact, accounting and patrimonial creativity was as developed and appreciated in
ancient  times  as  it  is  now,  and  had  reached  a  degree  of  refinement  still  unsurpassed,
although through exploring other ways than today’s “golden boys.”
10
shows that a great variety of possibilities was open to founders, and gave them a
free hand on that point.
As for the right of patronage,  founders’  liberty was somewhat more con-
strained.  To  be  the  patron  consisted  in  nominating  the  incumbent,  under  the
conditions  set  by  the  founder  and  by  the  Church.  This  was  one  of  the  most
appreciated  rights  derived  from  the  foundation.  To  be  master  of  positions,  in
Ancien Régime societies, meant social and political power. The Pope, for instance,
established his influence in Spain when he got hold, at the end of the medieval
period, of the faculty of nomination to all parochial benefices vacated during eight
of  the  twelve  months  of  the  year,  and  to  the  benefices  vacated  through  the
promotion of incumbents to other positions. This influence was broken when the
king, in 1753, took over for himself these papal faculties of patronage.9 Till then
civil  power  had  been  unable  to  curb  the  national  clergy,  not  because  Spanish
clerics  particularly  liked  the  Roman  Curia,  but  because  they  knew promotions
came from there. Patrons were named by the founder, the first one personally, the
next ones by establishing an order of succession. Patrons also had a general duty of
overseeing that everything went well with the foundation. In many cases they also
assumed the function of administrators.
The canvas we have just described was open to many variations. We must
stress once more that the main character of Christian foundations was plasticity,
which allowed them to adapt to a variety of needs and situations. Let us see some
examples.
2. The Foundation Embodied: As Many Forms as Needed
On 5 January 1785, in Puebla de Los Angeles of New Spain, Agustín Ovando de
Cáceres sells an inn located in Nopaluca, a neighboring village, to Nicolas Paez.
This inn, the global value of which is estimated at 3,500 pesos, is charged with the
principal of various foundations, up to the total amount of 2,820 pesos: 1,500 pesos
of an “obra pía” (pious work) to celebrate with dignity the festival of Saint Joseph
in Nopaluca Parochial Church, founded by the seller himself some 20 years before;
1,000 pesos for another “obra pía” named “of the Pilgrim,” of which the seller is
patron; 100 pesos for a “memorial” mass sung yearly for the Indian workers who
died on Ovando Cáceres’ family estates; 80 pesos for another “obra pía” for yearly
masses on the day of Saint Joachin and Saint Ann in Nopaluca Church, of which
the seller is patron; and finally 240 pesos for a last “obra pía” of one yearly mass
9   The Spanish monarchy reached an agreement with Rome in 1753 which gave the king
the  right  to  provide  the  tens  of  thousands  of  ecclesiastical  positions  Rome  had  been
accumulating in Spain from the end of the medieval period [Hermann 1988: 129–140].
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on Saint Antony’s day, founded by José Martínez de Cevallos, the man from whom
Ovando Cáceres bought the inn. The buyer had to pay a yearly rent of 5 percent to
all these foundations, with the faculty to buy out the rent by paying back the prin-
cipal to the administrators of the relevant fund. The total amount of the principal
was obviously deduced from the price paid by the buyer. From a strictly economic
point of view, the operation was equivalent to a loan of 2,820 pesos at a 5 percent
interest, made to the owner of the inn by the various foundations.10
Some time at the end of the seventeenth century, Francisco de la Mata Sala,
governor  of  the  little  town  of  Quintanopio  in  Castile,  decided  to  establish  a
foundation to say masses for his soul after his death. He left a capital of 6,000
ducats, that is over 40 years of the income of an unskilled laborer. He invested it in
buying   the  position  of  substitute  to  the  king’s  advocate  in  the  Secretaría  de
Milliones  of  the  Council  of  Finance.  The  king  at  that  time  was  selling  every
position he could  as perpetual property to whoever cared to buy it. The salary paid
by the king would form the stipend from which the priest in charge of saying the
masses would be paid. Mata Sala named the town of Quintanopio as patron of his
foundation.  That  meant  that  the  municipality  would  make  sure  the  investment
produced money and chose the priest in charge of the masses.  To get the salary
from the king,  the administrative position had to be filled,  so that  Quintanopio
municipality had to find a deputy for the task. In 1750, Juan Antonio Gonzalo Soto
was such a deputy. He gave back almost all his salary to the foundation; he also
paid a rent of 100 ducats  a year to the daughter of his deceased predecessor—a
condition he had to accept   to get the job, and made a living from fees he levied on
litigants. That same year, the king decided to “incorporate to the real patrimony”
(that is, to retrieve) Soto’s position. Soto was left in charge. Such a change meant
that  he  was  no  longer  a  deputy  of  the  foundation,  but  a  full  incumbent.  The
foundation no longer had any right to the position, nor to the salary. The king had
to give back the money which had been paid to buy the right. He promised to pay
6,000 ducats to the chaplain-  cy as soon as the patron found a secure investment
opportunity for that amount. Meanwhile, Soto would go on paying the rent he used
to pay. The king gave him the money for that as a supplement to his salary.11
In September 1643, at Bárcena de la Puente, in Asturias, northern Spain,12
Juan Fernández Caballero made his will. He put into mortmain a house, a garden,
and 30 chestnut trees in favor of his son and heir, García, and of the eldest son    of
his son, and so on for ever, conditional to the marriage of his son with the daughter
of a neighbor, and to the payment of the stipend for a yearly mass for
10  Archivo Histórico Notarial de Puebla de los Angeles (Mexico), Notaría 1, box 50. This
document was provided by Michel Bertrand and Nicolas de Neymets.
11 Archivo General de Simancas, Dirección General del Tesoro, I, leg. 2503.
12 Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Audiencia, R. 990/35r 6 38 r.
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the founder’s soul, that is, more or less a day’s wage of an agricultural laborer. The
founder even made it clear that he did not want any special offering or distribution
of bread to poor people to be made, as was the custom for such celebrations. He
aggregated this foundation to another, created by his own grandfather, of which he
was the patron and of which García would be the patron after his father’s death. To
all practical intent, García and his descendants would from now on dispose of an
appreciable indivisible estate, which would pass to the next head of the family as
an addition to the portion of the inheritance he could legitimately claim under civil
law, in exchange for a very modest yearly rent.
Such cases, taken at random, stress the fact that establishing a foundation
was within the reach of many people, even those who did not belong to the
establishment. You only needed a small capital to charge a rent on a house or
field you owned. You did not even have to pay it yourself immediately—your
heirs would take over the burden, though they would only have to pay the rent.
The capital would in fact be made effective only when they sold the house, and
they would not even have to disburse it: it would take the form of a discount on
the price paid by the buyer to compensate for the rent he had to assume, as a
new owner, because the duty to pay the rent followed the asset. It is difficult to
imagine more flexibility. Of course, you also could do it on a grand style. You
could, as Juan Chaves  Mendoza  did  in  1629,  found  a  whole  monastery  for
Augustine friars—in that case in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, a place he was lord of
—and endow the new religious house with a building and all that was needed,
just to be its patron, have a say in the recruitment of new friars, get some
reserved positions for members of his family and, most of all, prestige. Chaves
Mendoza needed prestige. He was born in a middle-class family. His main asset
in life was to be a nephew of a confessor of King Philip II, a relationship which
procured him a brilliant career as a judge of the Council of Castile, the supreme
court of the kingdom, but it did not endow him with a prestigious pedigree. He
did what he could to become a member of the upper establishment. He bought the
seigneurial manor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and was created first viscount of La
Calzada. The foundation took place between the purchase of the manor and the
concession  of  the  title,  obviously  as an important step toward higher honors
[Gómez-Rivero 2003: 657–744]. You might make in that way a fantastic
investment. When Francisco Velazquez endowed the convent  of the Carmelite
sisters of Alba de Tormes, he could not imagine that Saint Teresa of Avila would
die and be buried there and that, apart from winning such a strong and privileged
advocate before God, he was making his own name famous forever. The grand
style was not, nevertheless, the most frequent way of establishing foundations in
the last centuries of the Ancien Régime. The bulk of the new endowments were
small-scale chaplaincies and other “obras pías” of the kind we described above.
The aim founders were pursuing was finally, in most cases, family interest. Let us
have a closer look at these points.
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3. The Role of Ecclesiastical Foundations in Social Life
3. 1. Religious Foundations: A Pervasive Phenomenon
It is difficult not to come across religious foundations when studying any aspect of
Spanish life, or of any other Catholic country, in early modern times. This makes
most astounding the blindness of historiography on their account. All the examples
we have adduced, and all those we shall adduce from now on, have been gathered
in research programs which had nothing to do with ecclesiastical matters: they just
came along, in quite a casual way. Let us confess that we were not ourselves fully
aware  of  their  pervasiveness  till  we  began  planning  this  paper.  They  are  so
unassuming,  and  historians  so  conditioned  by  historiographical  traditions,  that
research  easily misses  them. Collaboration  with Islamic  historiography in waqf
studies called our attention to that point. Providing fresh insights is decidedly one
of the main virtues of transcultural studies.
In 1575, King Philip II ordered an inquiry on various aspects of local life in
various  localities  of  New  Castile.  It  included  questions  about  ecclesiastical
mortmain and foundations.  The inhabitants of Madridejos (presently part  of the
province of Toledo), answered:
“Clerics:  15,  besides  the  priors  of  the  Order  of  Saint  John  [Madridejos
belonged to the estates of the Order of Malta]. There are eight chaplaincies,
founded by inhabitants of the town, the beneficiaries of which are inhabitants
of  the  same.  The main part  provides  very short  rents.  There  also are  42
anniversary foundations [mortmains which funded masses to be said every
year  on the anniversary of  the founder’s  death],  which pay yearly  for  as
many masses said for their founders’ soul. There are two hospitals. The first
one, called Our Lady of September,  shelters poor travelers.  It  owns some
houses, the rent of which amounts to 3,000 maravedies13 and eight bushels of
wheat. The other one, Our Lady of August, shelters local poor people. Its
rents amount to 13 bushels of wheat...” [Viñas Mey and Paz 1951: Part 2, 1–
7]
To the same inquiry,  the village of Manzaneque answered: “In this place,
there is  no more than one church,  named Santa María,  and there  is  no private
chaplaincy here” [Viñas Mey and Paz 1951: Part 2, 19–28]. Yuncos, a village close
to Toledo, answered that it had “a vicar, with 200 ducados, more or less [financed
by tithes]... and an endowment with a service at the Church of the Epiphany of
Toledo, and another endowment for a student of the College of Valladolid, valued
13 The smallest Castilian coin and account unit. A laborer, at that time, could earn around 10,000
maravedis a year.
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at more or less 15,000 or 20,000 maravedis yearly” [Viñas Mey and Paz 1951: Part
2, 815–819].
Torrijos belonged to the same province. It was somewhat larger.
“In  this  town,  there  is  only  one  parish,  called  Lord  San  Giles,  with  an
endowment  for  the  vicar,  another  endowment  without  service  [“service”
meant that the incumbent had to reside there], two other benefices,  ten or
twelve chaplaincies with lay patrons, the patron of which is the municipality
itself, the town council presents candidates, and the archbishop puts them in
possession of the benefice.  These chaplaincies own vineyards,  olive trees,
houses and are in charge of saying masses in accordance with the rent they
get... The benefice without service belonged to Antonio Muñoz, of Toledo.
Judicial proceedings are presently under way about who is to have it. There
is also in this town a church, called the Very Holy Sacrament, founded and
endowed by the Most Illustrious Lady Teresa Enríquez, who left one million
marave-  dis  in purely lay estates  [that  is,  independent  from ecclesiastical
jurisdiction,  see  note  5].  The  church  has  a  head-chaplain  and  twelve
chaplains, with a sexton (who must be a cleric), a choirmaster and twenty
boy singers, and an organist...” [Viñas Mey and Paz 1951: Part 3, 620–631].
In 1759 King Ferdinand VI’s civil service brought to a close the first detailed
census preserved of the houses of Madrid. Each block (manzana) was mapped on
a separate sheet of paper, every plot was charted and drawn with its dimensions.
Each map matched an entry in a special register which gave further details about
each one of the plots: the name of its owner, the global income generated, and its
position  in  relation  to  the  “aposento”  tax,  which  was  levied  to  pay  for  the
accommodation  of  the  court’s  servants.  We  studied  25  blocks,  some  located
downtown, some in more peripheral areas, making a total of 461 plots, probably
around one out of 20. We arranged them by function of their status as to mortmain.
We distinguished free possession, possession of a free asset by a member of the
clergy, as personal belongings,14 assets under ecclesiastical mortmain, and assets in
“mayorazgo,” a civil mortmain which we shall briefly discuss below, quite similar
in its social effects to ecclesiastical mortmain, and civil public buildings. To test a
wide- spread hypothesis  as to the concentration of mortmain assets in the most
profitable areas, we built a special section for assets located on the Plaza  Mayor,
and another one for those which were not. The results were as follows:
14  The estates a cleric personally owned were subject to  ecclesiastical jurisdiction during
his lifetime, but were not considered as mortmain. They reverted to the cleric’s heirs after
his death.
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Chart 1: Madrid, 1759. Status in Relation to Mortmain of 461 Urban Plots15
Madrid except Plaza mayor Plaza mayor Total cases Total 
income
Number plots Income Number plots Income
Free assets of
clerics
5 1.3% 17,949 1.4% 0 0% 0 0% 5 1.1% 17,949
Free assets 208 53.5% 785,596 60.2% 37 51.4% 174,221 47.6% 245 53.1% 959,817
Ecclesiastical
mortmain
152 39.1% 408,012 31.3% 26 36.1% 109,266 29.8% 178 38.6% 517,278
Civil
mortmain
18 4.6% 87,122 6.7% 7 9.7% 57,043 15.6% 25 5.4% 144,165
Civil public
buildings
6 1.5% 6,538 0.5% 2 2.8% 25,566 7% 7 1.5% 32,104
Total 389 100% 1,305,217 100% 72 100% 366,096 100% 461 100% 1,671,313
Roughly speaking, taking into account the income generated as well as the
sheer number of cases, we can assume that around one-third of the building plots
of Madrid were ecclesiastical mortmain. Civil mortmain accounted for less than 10
percent. More than half the plots were under free ownership.16 About half the plots
in ecclesiastical  mortmain were  wholly managed  by an  ecclesiastical  authority,
probably with some obligations to the founders. The other half were chaplaincies,
or memorial services, pious works, and the like, which remained in fact under lay
management.
We  may conclude that the sheer weight of ecclesiastical mortmain makes it
a basic feature of early modern Spain. The same is true of the rest of Europe. We
have in fact no clear idea of the geography of religious foundations. Our examples
all come from Spain. We suspect that Portugal and Italy were not so different. Of
other Catholic countries we know little, although the amount of wealth which the
Church accumulated in these countries points to a not so different situation, maybe
to a somewhat lesser degree. In Castile, around 17 percent of all agricultural land
was ecclesiastical mortmain in the middle of the eighteenth century,  and almost
25 percent of the value of agricultural production [Grupo 75 1977: 197–210]. The
same was true of a still more important proportion of urban housing. In France,
recent studies put at 6.5 percent the proportion of French territory in clerical hands
[Bodinier et al. 2000: 501; Luna 2016: 385–412]. This estimate though is based on
15  Archivo General de Simancas, Patronato, leg. 94, doc. 08, “Libro segundo de los asien-
tos de las casas de Madrid.” We studied blocks 1–10; 142; 160–169; 193–196. We used the
edition  of the  source given  by  [Camarero Bullón 1986].  Our  student, Natalia  González
Heras, drew our attention to this document.
16 We say nothing of areas in this first approach. Areas per se do not mean anything when
unrelated to the quality of the plot, a rather tricky estimate in an urban context where such
values vary hugely from one point to another.
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the declaration of owners to the Revolutionary government prior to confiscation.
We suspect that it is grossly undervalued. Many Protestant countries maintained the
medieval system of endowment. It still exists in England. They preserved it howev-
er on a basis which left less room for private initiative and creativity, that is, with a
more strictly ecclesiastical tone. Much probably depended, as far as these changes
were concerned, on the religious denomination to which the sovereign belonged.
From  this  brief  survey,  anyway,  a  fact  emerges:  studying  religious
foundations is an urgent  task. The idea we entertain of European social  history
without taking them into account is probably a deeply biased one.
3. 2. Some Good Reasons to be Generous with the Church
We  know too much of  religious  anthropology to  dismiss  as  irrelevant  spiritual
motivations, mostly when the society one lives in assumes them as an “order of
greatness.”17 We know too much of social history to imagine that nothing more was
at stake.18 At a previous stage of our research we observed families of the Spanish
establishment over long periods of time, namely from the end of the fifteenth to
the beginning of the nineteenth century.  We tried to reconstruct the whole set of
actors who acknowledged themselves as members of the same family,  to list as
far as possible all their actions in relation to this family,19 and to measure how far
this conscious belonging to a family influenced their social life. We found beyond
any reasonable doubt that  preserving family patrimonies was the first and more
fundamental goal pursued by all members of the Spanish establishment. They had
(a) to prevent patrimonial division among various heirs, which would deprive the
family of the capacity of playing under equal conditions with its contenders in the
social market, (b) to provide, in each generation, the necessary number of males to
secure male succession to the trunk, so as to receive and keep the patrimony inside
the stem and prevent its passing to other families through the marriage of female
heiresses with male outsiders,  (c)  to secure for  themselves whenever possible a
female heiress from another family and, obviously, the patrimony which went with
her, to provide the necessary resources in order to compensate for the depreciation
of their own patrimonial assets as time elapsed, and (d) to provide king and Church
with as many and as  high-ranking agents  as possible to ensure as profitable as
possible a redistribution of Church and state resources in favor of the family. They
17  On this concept, and on its application to religious beliefs, see [Boltanski and Thévenot
1991: 484].
18 What follows is based on previous basic research we published in [Dedieu 1998; 2002;
Dedieu and Windler 1998].
19  Some good genealogical works provided the global factual frame which made this work
possible. The contribution of [Mayoralgo Lodo 1991: 957] was invaluable on this point.
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were confronted with two kinds of problem: (1) these objectives were mutually
contradictory, and (2) biological uncertainties20 made impossible any real long-
term  planning,  and  made  it  obligatory  to  create  a  complex  tissue  of  family
combinations so as to be able to mount an emergency alternative in case something
failed. Social  strategies  were more like American football  or  rugby than chess.
Security did not depend on short-term and short-range solutions, but on a capacity
to retreat, when necessary, to strong, previously organized defensive positions, if
possible to positions which could not be affected by any event with a negative
incidence  on  the  family.  The  Church  provided  such  positions,  for  persons
(priesthood)21 and assets (foundations), with a convenient degree of independence
from mundane hazards.
We  saw how, from an institutional  and legal  point  of view,  ecclesiastical
endowments opened a space in which donors could settle under the protection of
ecclesiastical law, and store resources for future use. Foundations in favour of mon-
asteries, family chaplaincies, and the endowment of grants in favour of universities
made it possible to assign positions to younger sons, who were a precious asset as
long as the eldest one had not begot successors, but a cumbersome liability once
he had; and to daughters, who were still more a danger (see point [b] above). Land
and capital accumulated in foundations of the kind that Juan Fernández Caballero
had founded were at  the eldest  son’s disposal,  as he usually was the successor
as administrator and patron of the foundation, a resource to which he succeeded
without it being legally considered as part of his inheritance, a kind of mayorazgo
into  which  an  appreciable  part  of  the  patrimony  had  been  diverted,  every
generation adding its  bit  (see Fernández  Caballero,  above),  out  of reach of any
other heir,  except the one who would be in charge of perpetuating the family
stem.
Therefore, to be generous to the Church was to be generous to oneself.22 We
are unable to evaluate rightly what proportion of the huge resources diverted from
economically  efficient  investments  into  mortmain  for  the  preservation  of
patrimonial  integrity  was  preserved  by  the  Church.  We  have  an  idea  of  its
contribution to the management  of  persons,  an important  part  of this policy,  in
various countries,23 enough to write confidently that its role was fundamental. We
know far less of its monetary contribution. We have some examples of bishops
who passed important amounts of ecclesiastical income to their family, and we also
20  Infant mortality was as high in the Spanish upper classes as among the people in gener-
al, as consanguinity probably amply compensated for the benefit of better food and general
living conditions.
21 When the duke of Lerma, a great Spanish minister, grew aware around 1618 that his
favor was decaying and a trial grew every day more probable, he made himself a cardinal,
in order to escape lay jurisdiction [Elliott 1986: 34].
22 We wholly ratify on this point the conclusions of [Wobeser 1996; Pro Ruiz 1989].
23  Apart from  our own  contributions,  see for  instance [Loupès 1985: 590],  [Ago  1990:
190], and the famous (and ground-breaking) [Reinhard 1974].
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know cases of complex strategies in which various relatives associates themselves
to put the scattered pieces of a dispersed patrimony on the head a clergyman so as
to rebuild it as a united entity [Huovinen 1995]. But we know little more.
3. 3. Lay Foundations. The “Mayorazgo”
One of the best clues to the social importance of religious foundations in Spain as
a tool for patrimonial transmission is the fact that they probably gave birth, at the
end of the medieval period, to a cloned laicized version, the mayorazgo.24 Founding
a mayorazgo meant isolating a block of assets which would be transmitted directly
and en bloc to the eldest son.25 The rest of the patrimony would be divided between
all heirs, including the one who received the mayorazgo. This meant that the main
heir was strongly favoured in relations to his brothers. He could not remove any-
thing from the  mayorazgo, but he could add to it, as could any other member of
the family.  Favoring a daughter  who would remain a spinster and at  her  death
leaving her properties to the  mayorazgo, was a basic successoral strategy.  To all
practical effect, and from the strict point of view of the family, mayorazgos had the
same results as religious foundations, without any need to pay the Church for the
protection afforded by sustaining a benefice, and preserving the family from any
ecclesiastical interference. Creating a foundation meant in fact that in most cases
any  transaction  affecting  the  assets  included  in  it  had  to  be  validated  by  an
ecclesiastical  judge,  and  that  any  lawsuit  related  to  it  had  to  be  decided  by
ecclesiastical courts. They were not worse than the king’s tribunal, but not better,
and  things  could go far, to Rome, where litigation was notoriously expensive. A
mayorazgo warranted that the case would not leave Spain.
Mayorazgo was as foreign to usual civil laws as foundations were. Like
foundations, it needed to be backed by an authority absolute enough to enforce 
24  The best studies on the origin of the  mayorazgo  do not take into account any form of
possible imitation. Although Spanish legal doctrine explicitly established a direct equiva-
lence between mayorazgo and some classes of religious foundations [Febrero 1825: Vol. 2,
79], their authors were simply unaware of the importance of religious foundations. [Clavero
1974],  the  main  Spanish  authority  on  the  matter,  rightly  points  to  a  social  demand  for
patrimonial security, which the mayorazgo provided, not only by enforcing the domina- tion
of one, and only one, of the siblings, but also by exempting,  de facto,  mayorazgos  from
confiscation in case of treason.
25  Or daughter  in  the  case  of  a  lack  of  male  heirs,  unless  the  founder  had  created  the
mayorazgo  with  a  special  “estricta  agnación”  clause,  which  eliminated  women  from
succession to prevent their taking away through marriage the mayorazgo to another family.
This  disposition  was  deemed  so  adverse  to  natural  law that  it  almost  invariably  led  to
lawsuits con- cluding in a marriage between the daughter and the designed heir, frequently
an uncle of   the daughter, with disastrous results from a biological and reproductive point
of view.
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such a break of natural law. Foundations were backed by the authority of the
Church,  Mayorazgos by the authority of the king. They  were  first  created  when
politi- cal theory explicitly endowed the king with an absolute character. Only the
king  could  create  a  mayorazgo.  Only  the  king’s  supreme  courts,  the  royal
Chanceries   of Granada and Valladolid, and the Supreme Council of Castile, could
act in law- suits in which mayorazgos were involved. The mayorazgo in turn was
an efficient tool in the king’s hands to tame aristocratic families. The mayorazgo
spread from the fifteenth century on, first among higher Castilian aristocracy and
later slow-    ly extending its reach to lower aristocratic circles, then to the gentry.
At the end    of the seventeenth century, it was so usual that owning a mayorazgo
now meant nobility and the foundation of a  mayorago  was a preliminary step to
ennoblement. First invented in Castile, a kingdom whose successoral laws favoured
patrimonial  division,  it  extended  to  the  Crown  of  Aragon,  especially  in  the
eighteenth  century.  At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  it  had  placed
religious foundations in a subsidiary role in the patrimonial strategies of Castilian
nobility.  Foundations, nevertheless,  preserved their role in the middle and upper
middle classes. They were, as an author rightly defines them, a “mayorazgo for
the poor” [Barbaza 2000].
Conclusion
This brief survey leads to the following conclusions.
A. In early modern Europe, some forms of Christian religious foundations were
astoundingly close to their waqf equivalent. Lawyers used a similar vocabulary to
describe both institutions, the same arguments to justify them and similar
categories  to  classify  them.  Societies  used  them  in  a  similar  way  for  the
management of family estates. It will of course be necessary to have a closer look
at the matter before jumping to conclusions, to calibrate better the social context
and  make  sure  that  superficial  analogies  did  not  hide  deeper  differences.
Nevertheless, a community of legal forms cannot be denied. How was it possible?
Must we resort to a (dubious) representation of the Mediterranean Basin as an area
of common civilization? Does a common history explain that different societies
“invented” such similar  social/  religious behaviors?  Does the reason lie,  on the
contrary, in common constraints which strictly limited and directed human abilities
in the creation of tools for the management of social life?26
B. In Western societies at least, the observed social practice was rather at variance
from the spiritual  and charitable  aims supposedly assigned to foundations.  This
observation raises two questions. First is that of the relationship between
26  Others have already made these points,  although from a more limited anthropological
perspective. See [Trello Espada 2003: 445–470].
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social demand and socially accepted justifications in the shaping of institutions.
This  problem we leave  for  a  more  appropriate  occasion.  Second is  that  of  the
relationship between religion and social demand, a question which can be seen as a
special part of the previous one. We shall only approach it here from its strategic
dimensions.  Western  clerics  were  always  conscious  that  the  strength  of
ecclesiastical institutions was highly dependent on the goodwill of the state, of civil
institutions, and, more  widely,  of the establishment. The break-down of Christian
unity  in  the  sixteenth  century  and  the  surge  of  various  competing  religious
denominations fighting to win the upper hand in Europe made them still  more
painfully aware  that they had to accept compromising arrangements with social
demand  in  order  to  preserve  an  alliance  which  they  considered  as  basically
necessary [Reinhard and Heinz Schilling 1995]. They knew that the social practice
which had grown around ecclesiastical mortmain only remotely matched Christian
precepts. Leading sectors of the clergy disapproved of it. But they had to endure it
[Gibert 1750: specially his comments on beneficial resignations,  Vol. 2, 21]. The
social  and  economic  relevance  of  religious  foundations  was  abolished  in  most
European countries in  the 60 years following the French Revolution, and the assets
accumulated under ecclesiastical jurisdiction sold away for the state’s benefit. This
was not purely the result  of an attack of  unbelievers  against  a passive Church.
Ecclesiastical  circles  collaborated  in  the  undertaking  or  easily  accommodated
themselves to the new situation, in an effort to recover independence from civil
society [Artola Renedo 2013: 383]. Many Catholic families of the establishment
helped  with  the  secularization  of  Church  foundations,  in  the  name  of  family
strategy,  by  massively  buying  nationalized  Church  properties,  or,  in  Spain,  by
getting  back  for  purely  lay  uses  the  assets  they  had  piled  up  into  foundations
[Vázquez  García-Peñuela 1990:  n.  1].  They had no idea  of  committing treason
against the Church. They were using it, exactly as they had always done. The social
and economic context until the end of the eighteenth century demanded stability
for patrimonial assets, and the Church provided that  stability.  Nineteenth-century
conditions demanded flexibility: the Church gave back what had been entrusted to
it as a deposit [Caro Baroja 1980: 243]. It lost in the wake of this devolution much
of its social influence and it had to reconstruct  its own theology in a way which
made the  new Ultramontane  Catholicism quite  a  different  confession  from the
eighteenth-century brand. The Catholic sectors of the establishment, for their part,
went on undisturbed.
C. Mortmain was also attacked from a civil point of view. From the eighteenth
century on, economists made mortmain responsible for introducing unsustainable
rigidities  in  the  economic  and  social  systems.27 Modern  historians  confirm this
opinion,28 as do contemporary mortmain holders: the first forced sale of religious
27 A classical text in Spain is [Jovellanos 1795].
28 This is the main conclusion of [Yun 2004: 623].
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foundations, and the voluntary sale of civil mayorazgos, instituted in 1798 in Spain
to pay for a war against  England,  were a success.  Many holders volunteered to
sell unprofitable assets of over-large and over-dispersed patrimonies accumulated
through the mortmain mechanism, to get the necessary capital to invest in more
profitable sectors [Herr 1989: 879]. Mortmain had grown in such a way as to stifle
the Spanish economy: in the kingdom of Murcia,  the only region for which we
have a reliable evaluation, of the water which was a fundamental commodity in an
arid area, at least half the irrigated and a third of the non-irrigated fields were held
in mortmain at the end of the eighteenth century [Pérez Picazo 1990: 103].
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